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In a fortified rowhouse in West Philadelphia, a bomb dropped by Philadelphia Police killed 
eleven MOVE members, including five children, and burned down sixty-five other houses after a 
lengthy standoff between the two groups. MOVE was a cult-like organization which eschewed 
technology, medicine and western clothing, where members lived communally, ate raw food, left 
garbage on their yards, and proselytized with a loudspeaker, frustrating the residents of Osage 
Avenue. The MOVE Bombing or what is called “May 13, 1985” in West Philadelphia, was a 
pivotal moment in the mayoral reign of Wilson Goode and was the first time a U.S. city bombed 
itself. The bomb dropped on the MOVE rowhouse with only marginal consequences to the city 
government because of previous encounters with MOVE and antipathy in the public towards the 
MOVE organization resulting in the group falling into obscurity.1   
                                                 
1 For further reading on cults in America, see Willa Appel, Cults in America: Programmed for Paradise (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983) which discusses the phenomenon of cults and how one is indoctrinated or breaks 
out of a cult. For further reading on African Americans and institutions see Dorothy K. Neman, Protest, Politics and 
Prosperity: Black Americans and White Institutions, 1940-1975 (New York: Pantheon, 1978) or Annette Gordon-
Reed, ed., Race on Trial: Law and Justice in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) which 
discuss how African-Americans were treated by the police and in the court as well as other white dominated 
institutions during this period. For more on the MOVE organization, see J.M. Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of 
Rebellious Thoughts: MOVE as Revolutionary Black Humanism,” The Black Scholar 32, no.1 (Spring 2002): 11-21 
which argues MOVE was a radical and religious group which exemplified revolutionary black humanist thinking. To 
find more on the effect of the media on the perception of MOVE, see Kimberly Sanders and Judson Jeffries, “Framing 
MOVE: A Press’ Complicity in the Murder of Women and Children in the City of (Un) Brotherly Love,” Journal of 
African American Studies 17, no. 4 (December 2013): 566-586, which discusses how the coverage by the press led to 
an attitude of antipathy towards the MOVE organization. For more on the MOVE bombing and its aftermath, see 
Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus MOVE (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994); Hizkias Assefa, Extremist Groups and Conflict Resolution: The MOVE Crisis in Philadelphia 
(New York: Praeger, 1988); Margot Harry, “Attention MOVE—This is America!,” Sage Journals 28, no. 4 (April 
1987): 5-28; Georgia A. Persons, “The Philadelphia MOVE Incident as an Anomaly in Models of Mayoral 
Leadership,” Phylon 48, no. 4 (December 1987): 249-260; or John Anderson and Hilary Hevenor, Burning Down the 
House: MOVE and the Tragedy of Philadelphia (New York: Norton, 1987) which all discuss the bombing and how it 
affected the city of Philadelphia and the city government. Some primary sources are the records of the Philadelphia 
Special Investigation into the MOVE Incident at Temple University and the Philadelphia Inquirer which reported on 
the MOVE and the bombing while it was occurring.  
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Vincent Leaphart founded the American Christian Movement for Life, later shortened to 
MOVE, in 1972 in West Philadelphia and changed his name to John Africa. MOVE was primarily 
a black organization, although white people could join as well. As an antisystem, antitechnology 
group, its members ate only a diet of raw fruits, vegetables, nuts and eggs, used no technology, 
medicine or western clothing, and disposed their garbage in the backyard and used outhouses 
instead of conventional toilets. The children of MOVE, who were not allowed to attend school, 
were illiterate, and had never eaten cooked food or watched television. These were the first “pure” 
members of MOVE: they were raised to never be exposed to the corrupting influences of social 
and political institutions. Members protested outside of zoos or pet stores, often leading to arrests 
though the police did not believe MOVE was even potentially violent during the early 1970s.2  
The other residents of Powelton Village did not have a great opinion of MOVE, which 
lived communally in three townhouses in the neighborhood. Powelton Village, located near Drexel 
University and the University of Pennsylvania, was a diverse and tolerant community and a haven 
for political activists.  In 1976, neighbors began complaining about children playing in the yard 
without diapers and in unsanitary conditions. Due to Powelton residents’ complaints, the police 
set up twenty-four-hour surveillance on the MOVE townhouses. The next year, MOVE members 
began to sit out on the porch holding rifles, wearing berets, and using loudspeakers to lecture their 
                                                 
2 Wagner-Pacifici,  Discourse and Destruction, 27-29; Sanders, and Jeffries, “Framing MOVE,”’ Complicity in the 
Murder of Women and Children in the City of (Un) Brotherly Love,” 566-586; Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of 
Rebellious Thoughts,” 11-21; Jack N. Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative Responsibility: Lessons of 
the MOVE Disaster,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 10, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 1-23; Assefa, Extremist 
Groups and Conflict Resolution, 14-15. 
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neighbors. MOVE already held a reputation as a radical black organization, much like the Black 
Panthers, because of MOVE’s emergence during the “Black Power” era. Many in Philadelphia 
believed that the public display of weapons to be the start of the organization becoming more 
militant.3  
Tensions between the city and MOVE began to rise as neighbors in Powelton continued 
complaining about MOVE’s actions and as the police department’s surveillance of MOVE began 
to infuriate them. In the year between 1977 and 1978, MOVE left bomb-timing devices, though 
no explosives, in several hotels across the nation as well as in London. These devices were left 
with threatening letters stating that MOVE would strike for real unless Philadelphia stopped its 
harassment. The organization had begun a feud with the then-Mayor Frank Rizzo, who had 
previously served as Philadelphia’s Police Commissioner and ran for mayor on a law-and-order 
campaign. MOVE’s residency in Powelton Village came to a head in 1978 after the May 5th 
Agreement between MOVE and the city disintegrated. The city and MOVE agreed that the city 
would end the blockade and within 90 days MOVE members would relocate to a residence outside 
the city. MOVE saw the city as at the heart of the issue, and they stayed past the 90-day limit. 
While several organizations active in Powelton Village at the time were either pro-MOVE or 
supported negotiation with MOVE to allow them to stay in the neighborhood, MOVE and the 
police engaged in a protracted firefight resulting in the death of one policeman, Officer James 
Ramp, and the sentencing of nine MOVE members to jail for the officer’s death.4 
                                                 
3 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 29-31; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative 
Responsibility”, pages; Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts,” 11-21. 
4 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 30-32; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative 
Responsibility,” 1-23; Assefa, Extremist Groups and Conflict Resolution, 20-37; Nine members of MOVE were 
convicted in the shooting of Officer James Ramp during the 1978 shootout with the police and were sentenced with 
thirty to one hundred years in prison. These members are known collectively as “The MOVE Nine”. 
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After being forced out of Powelton Village, MOVE took up residence in a townhouse on 
Osage Avenue in Cobs Creek, West Philadelphia. At first, MOVE and the residents of Osage 
coexisted peacefully. In time, however, tensions began to grow as lifestyle differences emerged 
and the neighbors began complaining. MOVE left their garbage outside, collected animals and fed 
them food, they would take the neighbor’s pets and remove their flea collars and they built pigeon 
coops. Most distressing to Osage Avenue residents was the MOVE children appeared to be 
malnourished and rummaged through their trash looking for food. The neighbors were told Wilson 
Goode would help them if they would just wait until after he had become mayor, but in late 1983 
after the mayoral election, MOVE began to use bullhorns and loudspeakers to harass their 
neighbors.5  
MOVE believed Mayor Goode had the ability to release the jailed MOVE 9 members, and 
they knew if they began to harass residents of Osage Avenue, a middle-class neighborhood and 
the bedrock of Goode’s political support, the city would have to do pay attention to them. After he 
won the mayoral election, despite MOVE holding the block hostage to obtain the release of fellow 
members, Goode used a policy of avoidance, appeasement, and non-confrontation towards MOVE, 
attempting to avoid conflict in any way possible. City Operating Departments—Health, Water, 
Human Services, Streets—were barred by city policy from carrying out their responsibilities at the 
MOVE rowhouse. City officials believed MOVE would stop its harassment once they realized the 
city was ignoring them and would either change their belligerent behavior or leave the city. This 
                                                 
5 Assefa, Extremist Groups and Conflict Resolution, 102-108; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative 
Responsibility,” 1-23. 
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policy of non-confrontation and avoidance proved ineffective, and in 1984 the Philadelphia Police 
began to plan a course of action against MOVE, one of the first signs of what was to come.6 
Mayor Goode told the police he needed a plan of action against MOVE in the spring of 
1985. He wanted to explore the possibilities of arresting some MOVE members and obtaining a 
court order to hold the children. MOVE began fortifying their rowhouse in earnest in the fall of 
1984 and the winter of 1985, building a bunker made of railroad ties, logs and steel plates on the 
top of their house and they used similar material to fortify the walls. In April 1985 they announced 
with bullhorns their intentions to kill the mayor or any police officer who approached the fortified 
MOVE house. Neighbors claimed they had seen men with rifles on the roof and in the bunker of 
the house and they held a press conference where they threatened to take matters into their own 
hands. On the morning of May 13, 1985, the police attempted to serve warrants for the arrests of 
four MOVE members. These warrants were for misdemeanor charges and primarily served to get 
MOVE out of the neighborhood. Mayor Goode also required that any officers involved in the 1978 
shooting not be involved in the operation on Osage, but despite this, several of those officers were 
present in the assault force.  At 5:30 A.M. outside the MOVE rowhouse, police used a bullhorn to 
announce the names of the members to be arrested for illegal possession of explosives and 
terroristic threats and gave the members fifteen minutes to surrender. MOVE refused. Police 
insertion teams then entered the houses on either side of the rowhouse. In response, MOVE shot 
at the police force from inside of the house. Over the next hour and a half, the Philadelphia police 
fired over 10,000 rounds of ammunition on the rowhouse and used explosives to blow holes in the 
walls. By 10:40 A.M. the front of the house was destroyed, but the fortifications MOVE had 
                                                 
6 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 32, 82-85; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative 
Responsibility,” 1-23; Assefa, Extremist Groups and Conflict Resolution, 110-111; Persons, “The Philadelphia 
MOVE Incident as an Anomaly in Models of Mayoral Leadership,” 249-260. 
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installed in the winter had held, preventing the police from seizing the house. When it became 
clear their tactics had failed, Mayor Goode, during a televised press conference, announced he 
would take the house by any means necessary.7 
After the press conference, the police began to plan another way to force out the eleven 
people in the house, including the use of explosives. They began assembling an explosive entry 
device around 4:30 P.M., and around fifteen minutes later, Mayor Goode approved the use of the 
entry device. Then, at 5:27 P.M., the police dropped an explosive package from a helicopter onto 
the bunker of the MOVE house. When the bomb exploded it did not remove the bunker; rather, it 
ignited a gasoline tank. Instead of trying to contain the resulting blaze, the police and fire 
commissioners decided to let the bunker burn. It was not until 6:32 P.M. that the fire department 
turned on its hoses and it took until 9:30 P.M. for them to take more active steps to contain the 
fire. The fire raged on until 11:41 P.M. engulfing 61 homes, damaging 110 houses, killing John 
Africa and the ten other occupants of the MOVE house, five of them children, and leaving 250 
men, women, and children homeless.8 
The bombing of the MOVE rowhouse should have been pivotal event in the history of 
Philadelphia, showing the incompetence of city officials in an explosive finale. Yet, after the 
bombing, Mayor Goode and the Philadelphia Police Department received an outcry of support 
from around the country. The Los Angeles Police Chief at the time, Daryl Gates, defended the use 
of an explosive device, declaring it “a sound tactic”. Gates also stated “[Mayor Goode] has 
provided some of the finest leadership [he had] ever seen from any politician” and that he hoped 
                                                 
7Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 87-94; Assefa, Extremist Groups and Conflict Resolution, 111-113; 
Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative Responsibility,” 1-23. 
8Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 95-96; Assefa, Extremist Groups and Conflict Resolution, 113; Nagel, 
“Psychological Obstacles to Administrative Responsibility,” 1-23. 
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“[Mayor Goode] ran for national office”. Michael Nutter, then an assistant to a city councilman 
said “[MOVE] is a group of people whose philosophy is based on conflict and confrontation”. Roy 
Innis, who was the chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), called Mayor Goode’s 
handling of the crisis “heroic”. Tom Cremans, the former director of Accuracy Systems Inc which 
sells munitions to police departments, said “the police exercised remarkable restraint in not using 
the device earlier”. However, the bomb squads of many cities were reluctant to comment on the 
incident, not wishing to criticize their fellow officers.9  
Despite those speaking in favor of the mayor and the Philadelphia Police Department, not 
all law enforcement officers were complimentary of Philadelphia’s handling of the MOVE crisis. 
The director of the American Federation of Police, Gerald Arenberg, believed “They broke every 
rule in the book” when it came to their handling of the MOVE incident and the bombing. James 
Fife, a police lieutenant in New York City, described it by saying, “They burned down the village 
to save the village” before continuing, adding that the actions taken by the Philadelphia Police 
Department were “really unheard of”.  According to Fife and Arenberg, many police departments 
have small armored tanks that can be used to batter doors down without endangering the lives of 
the officers and Arenberg stated the Philadelphia police “just weren’t using all the equipment 
available to any modern police department”. The MOVE bombing captured the attention of the 
world, and as many law enforcement agencies weighed in on the actions of the Philadelphia police, 
so too did the media, both national and international.10  
                                                 
9 Ron Wolf, William K. Marimow, Steve Lopez and John Woestendiek, “How the Bomb Decision was Made,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 17, 1985; Tom Infield, Doreen Carvajal and Robert J. Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened 
Fire Two Days Prior to Assault,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 20, 1985; William K. Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb on 
Radicals’ Home in Philadelphia,” New York Times, May 14, 1985. 
10 Tim Weiner, “Experts on Police Procedure Criticize Bombing of House,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1985. 
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The media took a largely critical view of the MOVE incident and Mayor Goode. Many 
newspapers around the world were unsympathetic to the siege of the MOVE rowhouse and called 
Philadelphia a “war zone”. Front-pages of many newspapers showed pictures of smoldering 
rowhouses in West Philadelphia. The Washington Post referred to the pictures as resembling “war-
torn Beirut” and the New York Daily News called the bombing “a terrible, unnecessary, and costly 
blunder”. The MOVE bombing attracted national attention with newspapers in France paying 
considerable attention to the MOVE incident, the France-Soir had an aerial photo of the 
devastation and Liberation, a French tabloid, called the incident “one of the most unbelievable 
urban guerrilla operations that America has ever known”. In Moscow, a newscaster reported: “six 
dead, 60 houses destroyed, hundreds homeless—such is the sinister result of a bloody slaughter 
which was launched by police”. The San Francisco Chronicle was extremely harsh in its criticism, 
writing there was “no excuse” for the bombing and it was “an astonishing example of overkill”. 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution was also critical, calling it reckless and including comments 
from people such as Burton Caine, the president of the Philadelphia chapter of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) who called the bombing “totally unjustified” and New York Mayor 
Edward Koch who stated that “if [he] had a police commissioner so stupid to allow a bomb to be 
thrown into a house, [he] would remove him”. The Dallas Morning News focused on the residents 
of the 6200 block of Osage. One resident, Kevin Young, called the bombing “unjustifiable” and 
said Osage “is not a battle zone”. Harry Smeck, another resident, said that he was “totally 
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disgusted” with the city and how it had handled the crisis. These harsh comments about the 
administration and its action were widespread after May 13, 1985 and its actions that day. 11 
Despite all these critical reports, some newspapers were more supportive of Philadelphia 
and the mayor. The New York Times referred to MOVE as a radical group, focused more on the 
complaints from the neighbors against MOVE and framed the incident as a city reacting against 
behavior that was well out of the norm for a working-class African-American neighborhood.  In 
the Times article, Dee Peoples, the owner of a store two blocks away from the MOVE house, said 
that “all you hear is aggression. You sleep with it, you wake up with it, you live with it” about 
living near MOVE. The San Francisco Chronicle wrote about MOVE’s strange philosophy and 
how while it was, in theory, a “philosophy of anti-materialism, pacifism and concern for the 
environment,” in practice “its history was replete with violence, obscenity and filth”. The 
Chronicle article stated that Donald Glassey testified John Africa “had planned an armed 
confrontation with police and had MOVE members make bombs and buy fire arms”. The 
Lexington Herald-Leader, like the Times, described MOVE as a radical organization and framed 
the siege as MOVE refusing “to leave the house under an eviction order from police”. The Herald 
article also discussed the neighbors’ complaints of “assaults, robberies, and a stench at the house”. 
The Philadelphia administration’s actions during this crisis were highly criticized and opinion on 
                                                 
11 Jane Eisner, “Media Blitz West Philadelphia Disaster Makes Front-Page Headlines Around the World,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1985; “Police Overkill,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985; “Police Tactics 
Questioned – Experts Call Use Of Explosives in Siege Situations ‘Reckless’,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, May 
15, 1985; “225 Left Homeless By Philadelphia Fire – Uprooted Residents Sorrowful, Angry; Mayor Defends MOVE 
Incident,” The Dallas Morning News, May 15, 1985.  
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them was highly divided among news sources around the city and the globe, but it was a much 
different story among the Philadelphia public.12   
Many of the Philadelphian public believed they were receiving biased news reports from 
the media. One woman from Valley Forge stated she “believed the mayor did a commendable 
job,” and “[the press was] questioning the mayor too much”. Many tourists visiting Philadelphia 
in the aftermath of the bombing had a similar reaction: “MOVE? It could have happened 
anywhere.” There was no feeling the MOVE incident would negatively affect Philadelphia from 
those visiting. One resident of Northeast Philadelphia, Eli Teper, complained the police “used too 
little force” and “criminals should be treated as such.” Some, like Steward Beatty, also of Northeast 
Philadelphia, thought the bombing was justified and it was “nice to see that somebody can still 
make decisions instead of doing nothing,” while a tourist from Mississippi, Felix Kogan, agreed 
completely with the actions taken against MOVE, and like him, some in Philadelphia supported 
the police actions against MOVE. Steve Harmon, a resident of West Philadelphia, said the 
bombing of MOVE was “like Vietnam”. While the media and the police around the country were 
divided on the MOVE incident, most people in Philadelphia appeared to see it as a tragedy but 
were overall still supportive of the mayor and the city.13 
The media discussion about the incident shifted closer to the view of the public:  while it 
was a tragedy, most blame rested on the shoulders of MOVE. Two days before the bombing, 
MOVE sent a letter threatening to set fire to their rowhouse and the neighboring house should the 
                                                 
12 Eisner, “Media Blitz West Philadelphia Disaster,”; Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb on Radicals’ Home in 
Philadelphia,”; “MOVE’s Strange Philosophy of Militancy and Escapism,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985; 
“Radical Group Holds Police at Bay,” Lexington Herald-Leader, May 14, 1985. Donald Glassey was a MOVE 
member who became a government informant. 
 
13 Joyce Gemperlein, “Visitors Say the City’s Image Will Survive,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 19, 1985; Stevens, 
“Police Drop Bomb on Radicals’ Home in Philadelphia.” 
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police attack. This letter began, “If MOVE go down, not only will everyone in this block go down, 
the knee joints of America will break and the body of America will soon fall.” Then the letter 
threatened, “Before we let you mutha f-s [sic] make an example of us we will burn this mutha f-in 
[sic] house down and burn you all up with us”. The city administration began using the letter to 
attempt to paint MOVE as the group that began the fire that burnt down sixty-one houses and killed 
eleven people. The Police Commissioner Gregore Sambor stated it was his “personal opinion” that 
MOVE “started or assisted” the fire. Commissioner Sambor went on to say he was “convinced that 
MOVE people saturated those roofs with gasoline”. Mayor Goode said the letter showed MOVE 
was “a group that was bent on absolute destruction, a group that was, in fact, a guerilla group inside 
an urban area”. The Mayor also stated that the release of the letter was not meant as evidence that 
MOVE started the fire but that the letter “says what it says, in [his] opinion”.14 
In lockstep with the theory of MOVE burning down the street, the city began to discuss 
how the entry device used was extremely safe and could not have caused the fire. The explosive 
device used in the bombing was known as Tovex TR-2, manufactured by the Du Pont Company, 
who described Tovex TR-2 as “one of the safest explosives on the market”. Before the decision to 
use Tovex as the explosive device on the MOVE house, the Philadelphia Police Department 
secretly tested different explosives on lumber structures; however, Tovex TR-2 was not meant for 
above ground buildings but was instead developed for underground use primarily in mining. The 
media began to use the Du Pont Company’s label of Tovex as an extremely safe explosive to push 
the idea the fire was not the fault of the city. Mayor Goode took issue with the word bomb as well, 
explaining that “what [he] approved to be used was an entry device, which was to take and 
                                                 
14 Tom Infield, Doreen Carvajal and Robert J. Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened Fire Sent Two Days Prior to Assault,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 20,1985. The MOVE letter is transcribed in “MOVE Letter Threatened Fire Sent Two 
Days Prior to Assault.” 
12 
 
somehow remove the bunker from the top of the house. There was no intent to destroy the house”. 
The city attempted to paint MOVE as the aggressors, thereby framing the actions they had 
undertaken as merely providing law and order.15 
Shortly after the bombing, and amid calls for an official investigation into the 
administration’s actions, Mayor Goode announced his intentions to create a special investigation 
into the event. A special commission which had no members of the Goode administration, would 
examine the incident.  William J. Green, Mayor Goode’s predecessor, said the MOVE Special 
Commission “has serious, tough questions to ask [the] administration about how it conducted 
itself” and “there are many, many unanswered questions and in some cases contradictions that 
cannot and should not and must not…be swept under the rug”. The former mayor also said the city 
should release the police intelligence files on MOVE so “everyone in Philadelphia would know 
what the premise of [the] decisions were”. Despite Green’s harsh words on the city’s actions, 
Robert S. Hurst, the then president of Lodge 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police, said “the ultimate 
responsibility of the widespread property destruction remains squarely on the members of this 
terrorist organization known as MOVE” and public opinion in Philadelphia supported this idea. In 
a poll conducted by Teichner Associates of Philadelphia, 71 percent of respondents believed the 
mayor did a good or excellent job dealing with MOVE. Even with the support from the 
Philadelphia public, the commission was necessary for answering the questions on the city’s 
actions during this incident.16  
                                                 
15 Ron Wolf, William K. Marimow, Steve Lopez and John Woestendiek, “How the Bomb Decision was Made,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 17, 1985; Infield, Carvajal and Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened.”  
16 Larry Eichel and Robin Clark, “MOVE Death Toll Reaches 11 Goode to Pick Panel for Probe,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, May 16, 1985. 
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The MOVE Special Commission hired several people to conduct their investigation. James 
R. Phelan, one of the FBI’s explosive and counterespionage experts before he left the bureau two 
years earlier, and Charles King, an expert in the cause and spread of fires, were brought in to 
investigate the explosives used in the bombing. The original report on the explosive device 
indicated the only explosive used was Tovex TR-2. However, three months after the incident, 
Officer William C. Klein, testified he had also included C-4 in the device when he had assembled 
it. The commission also hired six other investigators to work underneath the lead investigator, Neil 
P. Shanahan. These investigators came from Connecticut, Chicago, Virginia, Maryland, as well as 
the Philadelphia area. William H. Brown III, the chairman of the commission, said the “search for 
the highest-quality, professional investigators [was] long and wide-ranging”. Brown added these 
investigators brought “the skills and expertise essential for the investigation to fulfill its mandate”. 
The investigators specialized in anti-terrorist programs, major violent crime, and homicide. As the 
inquiry continued, it became very critical of how the city managed the MOVE incident.17 
As the MOVE Commission’s hearings occurred, these testimonies began to paint Mayor 
Goode in an unflattering light. In his testimony, the mayor portrayed himself as misinformed and 
misled by his subordinates; he was as much a victim as a leader. He depicted himself as a leader 
who confirmed the decisions others made. This was odd, as Goode’s managing style as both city 
manager and mayor was very detail oriented. An assistant to the District Attorney, Bernard L. 
Siegel, testified before the grand jury that he had heard “the mayor [say] to the police 
commissioner, ‘You are the professional and you need not keep me advised of all the details’”. 
When the District Attorney, Ed Rendell, was asked about this statement, he thought it was 
                                                 
17 Larry Eichel, “MOVE Commission hires Former FBI Explosives Expert,” Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6, 
1985; Larry Eichel, “Commission Hires 6 Investigators”, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 19, 1985. Investigators named 
in article are Clyde E. Berry, James J. Creaturo, Frank L. Eccles, Albert J. Jordan, Thomas J. Mowrer, and Edward 
Scott Jr. 
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“somewhat unusual for Wilson [Goode]” before adding that the mayor’s “management style has 
always been to get involved in all the significant details”. The hearing revealed the mayor’s 
attempts to distance himself from the MOVE incident as it was occurring by purposefully asking 
to not get all the details. This opened Goode up to considerable criticism, the most significant from 
former Mayor William Green, who said Goode was pushing a theory of “reverse Nuremberg” 
responsibility, he could not be responsible for the incident because he had only accepted the 
recommendations from his subordinates. Charles Bowser, a member of the commission, criticized 
Goode in a less direct way, stating “the only person who had the foggiest notion of what was going 
to happen when the bomb dropped was a police lieutenant”. While these hearings demonstrated 
there was a major issue between MOVE and the other residents of the 6200 block of Osage, they 
also showed there had been poor communication and inaccurate or incomplete intelligence on the 
organization and incompetent leadership.18 
When the MOVE Special Commission reached a decision on the actions of the 
administration and the police, their report stated Mayor Goode and his administration displayed 
“reckless disregard for life and property” in their actions. The report stated, “dropping a bomb on 
an occupied rowhouse was unconscionable and should have been rejected out of hand” and “the 
plan to drop the bomb was reckless, ill-conceived, and hastily approved”. Commissioner Gregore 
Sambor and Managing Director Leo A. Brooks were declared “grossly negligent” for not calling 
off the siege. The report also called the mayor “grossly negligent” in his actions and said he 
“clearly risked the lives” of the children who had been killed in the house and this was “unjustified 
homicide”. Within the report, the commission condemned the mayor saying he “failed to perform 
                                                 
18 Larry Eichel, “D.A.: Goode Wanted No Details\Rendell Testifies on MOVE,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 23, 
1985.  
15 
 
his responsibility as the city’s chief executive by not actively participating in the preparation, 
review, and oversight of the plan”.  Goode “abdicated his responsibilities as a leader when, after 
midday, he permitted a clearly failed operation to continue [posing] great risk to life and property”. 
Despite believing MOVE to be an “authoritarian, violence-threatening cult,” the report declared 
the 10,000 rounds of ammunition fired into the rowhouse had been “excessive and unreasonable” 
and “the failure of those responsible for the firing to control or stop such an excessive amount of 
force was unconscionable” especially with children inside the building. The commission’s findings 
were overwhelmingly negative for Mayor Goode, and though this could have caused him to lose 
popularity within the city, that was not the case.19 
The MOVE Special Commission’s harsh criticisms of Mayor Goode were labeled as 
devastating by allies of the mayor, but the newspaper coverage of the report was largely supportive. 
An editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer, written shortly after the report was released, stated the 
author “[disagreed] with those who think Wilson Goode should resign”, and noted Philadelphians 
should not just judge the mayor on the MOVE incident, but should instead “judge him on his entire 
first term”. Mayor Goode also received a large outcry of support from his church followers after 
the report. The Inquirer reported “more than 250 people…gathered to pray for Mayor Goode”, 
and the Reverend U. O. Ifill Sr. described the prayer services as “a demonstration of the endemic 
support the mayor has in the black community”. Despite the findings of the MOVE Special 
Commission, Mayor Goode’s support in the city stayed strong and only grew.20 
                                                 
19 Thomas Ferrick Jr., “Report on MOVE Finds Goode ‘Grossly Negligent’ in Decisions Children’s ‘Homicide’ is 
Alleged,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 2, 1986.  
20 Acel Moore, “Bringing On The Problems Wilson Goode Sometimes Is His Own Worst Enemy,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, March 20, 1986. Russell Cooke, “Praying For Goode: The Faithful Rise Up,” Philadelphia Inquirer, April 
13, 1986.  
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Over the next couple of years after the MOVE disaster, Wilson Goode’s reputation began 
to recover. In an interview more than a year after the MOVE incident, Goode said that “[he] had 
some difficult days and difficult times in [his] administration, but [he had] done a lot of good, 
constructive things”. John F. White Jr., a city councilman, said “the administration has 
demonstrated far more experience over [the] year”. Goode’s reputation slowly recovered as the 
incident faded from memory, overshadowed by more flattering endeavors such as Goode 
successfully ending a strike involving 14,000 city employees, which created more confidence in 
him and his administration. During this period, the city had a major trash and sanitation issue 
which Mayor Goode proposed a trash-to-steam plant to be built in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. 
When several police officers were arrested on bribery and corruption charges, Mayor Goode was 
able to help restore confidence in the Police Department by implementing a reform package aimed 
at restructuring the department. It seemed, in the initial aftermath of the MOVE disaster, that 
Goode’s political career was over, but over the following two years he worked tirelessly to repair 
his image.21 
In 1988, his reputation restored and with the city’s collective goodwill, Goode ran for 
reelection against former mayor and police commissioner Frank Rizzo. It was a highly contested 
election, with the difference being only a slim margin of 17,176 votes out of 652,307 total votes. 
In Rizzo’s concession speech, he warned Mayor Goode that he would “have to deliver or [he is] 
going to be right on him”. Despite all the bad publicity that his actions against MOVE had brought 
                                                 
21 Russell Cooke, “For Goode, A Year of Recovery,” Philadelphia Inquirer, January 4, 1987; Robin Clark, “Police 
Reforms Unveiled Goode Begins Search for Chief,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 20, 1985; Thomas Ferrick Jr., 
“Report on MOVE Finds Goode ‘Grossly Negligent’ in Decisions Children’s ‘Homicide’ is Alleged”; 
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him, Goode’s rehabilitation of his image helped him beat Rizzo and become mayor for his second 
term.22  
Thirty years after the MOVE bombing, National Public Radio looked back at MOVE and 
learned that, despite the amount of media coverage it had at the time, many younger Philadelphians 
never even knew it had occurred. Tasneema Raja, an editor on an NPR show who grew up only 
twenty minutes north of Philadelphia never learned about MOVE in class, only learning about it 
from her father. Gene Demby, also from NPR, who grew up in South Philadelphia in the 1980s 
never discussed MOVE in class. Robin Wagner-Pacifici, who studies fringe radical groups at the 
New School, believes that other radical groups never identified with MOVE’s antitechnology, pro-
animal rights, and quasi-Rastafarian beliefs leading the group to be forgotten when discussing 
these radical groups. These groups, such as the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas and the Weaver 
family in Ruby Ridge, Idaho had beliefs which overlapped and mentioned each other in their 
manifestos, but “none of them mentioned MOVE”. Unlike the Branch Davidians who faced off 
against the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, or the Weaver Family who were sieged 
by the FBI, the Philadelphia police department bombed MOVE. This was not a showdown between 
a fringe radical group and the federal government, but with the local government. A lack of 
connection between the general public and MOVE's core beliefs, as well as the city's general 
ambivalence toward the group, have caused the MOVE bombing to fade into obscurity.23  
                                                 
22 Christopher Hepp and H. G. Bissinger, “Rizzo Concedes Defeat Says He’ll Remain Active in Politics,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, November 24, 1987. 
23 Gene Demby, “I’m From Philly. 30 Years Later, I’m Still Trying To Make Sense Of The MOVE Bombing,” 
National Public Radio, May 13, 2015, accessed November 4, 2018, 
 <https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/05/13/406243272/im-from-philly-30-years-later-im-still-trying-to-
make-sense-of-the-move-bombing>. Gene Demby, “Why Have So Many People Never Heard Of The MOVE 
Bombing?,” National Public Radio, May 18, 2015, accessed November 4, 2018, < 
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/05/18/407665820/why-did-we-forget-the-move-bombing>.   
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Goode’s victory over Rizzo for a second term as mayor was the first sign that the MOVE 
incident held minimal lasting significance to the city outside of Osage Avenue. The second sign 
was that schools in Philadelphia do not teach about MOVE, children living in Philadelphia do not 
learn about a major event in the history of the city. An event where the mayor bombs their own 
city, destroying sixty-one houses and killing eleven people, five being children. The MOVE 
bombing should have ended Wilson Goode’s political career, as well as the careers of the others 
involved in the decision making that led to the siege of the MOVE rowhouse and subsequent 
bombing of its bunker. This should have been an event woven into the very fabric of the city, 
instead it was forgotten—the perpetrators allowed to stay in office and to repair their image, their 
victims faded into obscurity. 
The MOVE bombing is an enormous black spot in the history of Philadelphia, and yet its 
occurrence is rarely, if ever, mentioned. That the bombing held no lasting impact in the psyche of 
Philadelphia is an affront to the deaths of those eleven MOVE members. While something needed 
to be done about MOVE, bombing their rowhouse was too far. Despite two grand juries on the 
bombing, no one from the city administration ever faced any consequences resulting from their 
part in burning down sixty-one houses and killing eleven people. That there has been no major 
lasting effect on the city of Philadelphia as a result of the MOVE bombing is a disgrace and a 
disservice to those whose homes burned in the blaze and those who perished as a result of the 
city’s actions.  
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